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Why It Matters
We study repeated contract design when a principal observes outcomes but not the actions that generate them.
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Discovered via ArXiv and published by ArXiv.
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Original description
We study repeated contract design when a principal observes outcomes but not the actions that generate them. The principal may use any bounded outcome-contingent payment vector, and the agent's best response can make expected profit discontinuous in those payments. For every fixed number $m\ge2$ of outcomes, the minimax regret over $T$ rounds is of order $T^{m/(m+1)}$, up to logarithmic factors. The upper bound allows arbitrary action spaces and agent heterogeneity, without smoothness or monotone-surplus assumptions. Its key is an effective-dimension reduction that the benchmark can be normali...
Discovered via ArXiv
Research papers and preprints from arXiv.
Publisher: arxiv.org
ID: http://arxiv.org/abs/2609.20353v1 · Indexed about 1 hour ago